


SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS IN AFRICA:
IS THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTING THE CORRECT TYPES OF SECURITY
COOPERATION MISSIONS IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT?



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS IN AFRICA: IS THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTING THE CORRECT TYPE OF SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT?, by Major Anthony Rickman, 97 pages.

Using ongoing missions in Africa as a case study, this research seeks to answer the question: is the United States Government pursuing an effective strategy for building security cooperation capacity within its partners and allies on the African Continent? It will pursue an answer to this question by first considering the current security cooperation missions being conducted on the African Continent, and compare these with security cooperation missions that have been, or are currently being conducted, in other geographical combatant commands area of responsibility around the world. It will then evaluate if there are security cooperation missions that are being conducted in other geographical combatant commands that can be applied to the Africa geographic combatant command area of responsibility.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AOR	Area of responsibility
CENTCOM	Central Command
CY	Calendar Year
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ENCAP	Engineer Civic Action Program
EUCOM	European Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
OHASIS	Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information Services
PACOM	Pacific Command
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When I was travelling through Africa last year what I heard was the desire of Africans not just for aid, but for trade and development that actually helps nations grow and empowers Africans for the long term. As president, I have made it clear that the United States is determined to be a partner in Africa's success; a good partner, an equal partner and a partner for the long term. We don't look to Africa simply for its natural resources. We recognize Africa for its greatest resource, which is its people and its talents and their potential.

— President Barack Obama

Overview

As the United States (U.S.) transitions out of Afghanistan, the U.S. will begin to shift focus to the other geographic combatant commands across the globe. While the majority of these efforts will be placed on the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility, there is also emphasis being placed on the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility (Department of Defense 2014, 5) as well as continuing to support the other four geographic combatant commands (GCCs) across the globe: U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Africa is a continent that is on the rise with six of the top ten countries having the fastest growing economies. With a vast supply of natural resources, it has become a global influence that competes for the national interests of all of the world powers (Banks et al. 2013, 1).

Over the past decade, the African continent has been plagued by instability that ranges from security, economic, civil and health concerns. In recent years, there has been

an increase in violence due to Muslim extremists. This has caught the attention of the world with the Boko Haram organizations violation of human rights and continued terrorist acts that jeopardize the security of northwestern African countries. Al Qaeda insurgents in Africa continue to operate out of the eastern African countries (USAFRICOM 2014, 3). While some countries' economies are on the rise, an overall majority of African nations are struggling with their economies. Despite the economic assistance packages that other countries provide, there are minimal support structures in place to implement and fully utilize economic aid packages (Banks et al. 2013, 3). From a human rights perspective, Africa has become a major hub for human and drug trafficking. Civil structure contributes to instability with the lack of or deterioration of educational institutions, local government facilities, and road networks that connect outlying villages and smaller communities. Health concerns also elevate the African continent to the world stage with the recent Ebola epidemic in 2014. With the outbreak of this deadly virus on the African continent, and subsequent spread to Europe and the U.S., there has been an increase in awareness and greater assistance from the international community. While Ebola is the lead topic for health concerns today, other health issues need to be addressed (World Health Organization 2015). According to the World Health Organization, there are over 125 million females that were subjected to female genital mutilation (World Health Organization 2014). The human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome epidemic continues to plague the African continent and remains the leading cause of death for adults. Since 2003, the number of people on advanced medicine has significantly increased; however, HIV still remains a lingering threat. Malaria and polio also continue to take a toll on children due to the lack of vaccinations.

Based on this, there is a dire need to establish and/or reinforce an existing preventive health care system within Liberia (World Health Organization 2015).

The U.S. has a long history of assisting underdeveloped countries through government agencies and the Department of Defense (DoD). The United States strategic plan is to conduct Phase Zero security cooperation operations with African partner nations. These security cooperation missions begin with stability assistance in the form of security, civil and medical support programs.

United States Africa Command

The lead DoD organization that is responsible for military operations in Africa is U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). USAFRICOM is a geographic combatant command that is assigned an AOR. The mission of USAFRICOM is:

United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. (USAFRICOM 2014).

The African Continent is a landmass that encompasses 11,700,000 square miles and is broken down into five distinct zones, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, and the East Horn of Africa (see figure 1). In the first few decades of political independence from colonial rule, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) divided the Africa continent into the five regions based off of political and geographical factors. These five regions were also designated as economic zones when it became necessary to establish regional economic integration for the five regions of Africa (Nanjira 2010, 31). In order for USAFRICOM to properly manage operations across this large AOR, USAFRICOM Headquarters is located in Germany and executes its missions

and operations through its Service component commands. The Service component commands are; U.S. Army Africa located in Italy, U.S. Air Forces Africa located in Germany, U.S. Marine Forces Africa located in Germany, U.S. Naval Forces Africa located in Italy, and U.S. Special Operations Command Africa located in Germany. Currently none of these headquarters are located on the African continent but USAFRICOM has placed infrastructure that provides enduring support on the continent. These enduring support centers on the continent are Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa located in Djibouti and Defense Attachés, offices of security cooperation and bilateral assistance officer that located within the U.S. Embassies across Africa.




Figure 1. Africa Overview: Regional Breakdown

Source: Strategic Forecasting Global Intelligence, “Africa Regional Interests,” 2007, accessed October 5, 2014, <https://www.stratfor.com/media-center?region=16>.

Each of the five regions in Africa presents unique problems ranging from human suffering, inadequate governance, and instability that must be addressed. In North and West Africa, Libya and Nigeria's degraded security situation presents opportunity for terrorist and criminal networks threaten U.S. interests. The possibility of another pandemic outbreak in Liberia also adds to the instability of this region (Rodriguez 2015, 7). The countries that make up Central Africa remain in a fragile state and remain vulnerable to humanitarian disasters. There is also security concerns with the Lord's Resistance Army that has a persistent presence and jeopardizes stability in the border areas of the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Southern Africa remains stable and continues to provide the most professional and capable military forces on the African continent: currently participating in peacekeeping operations in Central Africa (Rodriguez 2015, 11). The East Africa/Horn of Africa region has been a priority area for providing stability and offensive operations against the threat of piracy, al-Qa'ida and al-Shabaab from expanding on the African continent (Rodriguez 2015, 14).

Definitions

This section will explain the key definitions that apply to security cooperation missions within the DoD. Security Cooperation is defined as any DoD agency interaction with foreign defense establishments that will build defense relationships and promote U.S. national security interests. These interactions are carried out by the GCC's and will lead to an enduring alliance or partnering relationship that will permit the U.S to gain quicker access and host-nation support in foreign countries or territories. Security cooperation is a common Service function that supports combatant commands. Security

cooperation is a key element of theater shaping operations and is a pillar of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation. The most common types of security cooperation missions are medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs), engineer civic action programs (ENCAPs), and security force assistance programs (Department of Defense 2010, 111). Within each GCC, the supporting Tabs to the Appendixes of this paper provide a breakdown of the total number of security cooperation missions that are conducted across the GCC AORs in the past fiscal year (FY). Tabs 1 and 2 of each Appendix provide details for MEDCAP and ENCAP missions. The lead DoD agency for security cooperation is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The mission of DSCA is to direct, administer, and provide DoD-wide guidance for the execution of security cooperation programs (DSCA 2014, 4). DSCA also serves as the DoD lead for coordinating security cooperation programs with the other government agencies (see Figure 2). This single point of coordination allows the DoD to manage a large number of security cooperation programs across all of the geographic combatant commands.




Figure 2. DoD Security Cooperation Overview: Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Brief to Department of State” (Briefing, Washington, DC, June 7, 2011), accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.conferences.state.gov/RM/programmevaluation2011/Related%20Documents/Defense%20Workshops/Overseas%20Humanitarian%20Assistance%20Shared%20Information%20System%202.0.pdf>.

As the U.S. enters a post-war period and the DoD budget goes through reductions, security cooperation programs/missions/activities that build partnerships and partner capacity are now the primary focus of all GCCs. Although the Department of State (DOS) leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions, security cooperation activities are conducted and coordinated throughout the geographic combatant command AOR by military forces. Military forces build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (Department of the Army 2013, 1-1).

Primary Research Question

The primary research question for this paper is—“Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions in the African continent?” In order to answer this primary question, this paper focuses on the military and strategic implications of conducting Phase Zero shaping operations in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. This paper will identify the specific type of theater security cooperation mission that are currently being conducted on the African continent. Figure 3 provides an overview of a notional operational phased approach as determined by the DoD Joint Staff—Phase Zero begins with minimal military support however the military does have an important role by assisting the Department of State with establishing civic action programs with partner nations. By answering the primary research question, this paper will also identify how USAFRICOM can synchronize Phase Zero efforts amongst its component commands in order to provide short-term, mid-term, and eventually long-term results based on the desired end state.

Notional Operation Plan Phases




Figure 3. Notional Operation Plan Phases

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), III-39.

Secondary Research Questions

In addition to answering the primary research question, there will be additional questions that arise from this research. Upon determining if the correct types of security cooperation missions are being conducted, there will be secondary questions that will

arise. These secondary questions will include—“What types of security cooperation missions to conduct while taking into account the second and third order effects of conducting security cooperation missions in Africa?” How will these theater security cooperation missions impact stability across the different regions of the African continent? How can USAFRICOM enable host nations to perform these security cooperation missions on their own with little to no augmentation from U.S. or Allied forces? And, should a comparison be made with other geographic combatant commands to see if there are certain security cooperation programs that can assist USAFRICOM; in particular during support of MEDCAPs and ENCAPs? When conducting research, there are assumptions and limitations that can affect the outcome of a study. In an effort to reduce these affects, it is important to identify the following assumptions, limitations and delimitations in order to frame a common starting point for this study.

Assumptions

Assumptions are premises that are accepted as true, or at least agreed upon, by researchers and peers who will read this thesis. Assumptions are made to continue planning and are continually evaluated to ensure that assumptions remain valid (Department of Defense 2011, I-6). In his book, *Planning for Action: Campaign Concept Tools*, Dr. Jack D. Kem states that a majority of planning is based off of hypotheses and assumptions. A continuous evaluation and assessment of assumptions are important to allow planning to move forward. Once an assumption is determined to be invalid then it will be necessary to reframe a problem and come up with new hypotheses and assumptions (Kem 2012, 95). The reader should assume that certain aspects of this study are true given the research design. There are three key assumptions that apply to this

study. First, U.S. and multi-national partners are looking out for the best interests of African countries, and will not contradict United Nations (UN) guidelines and sanctions. While there are competing interests in the African continent amongst other world powers, such as China and Russia, the main focus of security cooperation missions is to help stabilize African partner nations (Banks et al. 2013, 11). Second, that the U.S. Government is the main audience when validating and discussing how to improve security cooperation missions on the African continent. Placing focus on USAFRICOM does not delineate from UN or multi-national sponsored or supported security cooperation missions. Third, that security cooperation missions being conducted in other geographic combatant command (GCC) areas of responsibility (AOR), such as USPACOM and USEUCOM, are more mature than those conducted in the AFRICOM AOR. Prior to 2007, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided between three GCCs-USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USCENTCOM. Security cooperation missions were conducted in the five regions but there was not a single strategy, or unity of effort, between the three GCCs to execute long-term security cooperation programs. USAFRICOM began initial operations in 2007, and officially became a geographic combatant command in 2008. Military control of the entire African continent belongs to USAFRICOM minus Egypt, which is within the designated area of responsibility of the USCENTCOM. The Horn of Africa is now under USAFRICOM as of the Unified Command Plan in 2011. These GCC security cooperation missions conducted prior to 2007 have been assessed as credible recommendations for USAFRICOM to utilize.

Limitations and Delimitations

There are limitations for this paper that involve the lack of access to classified information that pertains to African countries conducting security cooperation missions with the U.S. and other multi-national partners. There is also a lack of access to classified information from the other U.S. geographical combatant commands. There is also the lack of access to personnel who are working within the USAFRICOM and Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The period of time for the research of this paper only covers a one-year period, fiscal year 2014. With the U.S. shift of priorities and pivot back to the Pacific, using data for the past year will provide a more accurate picture of the performance of the GCCs as the U.S has drawn down from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. The final limitation to this paper is that the focus for security cooperation missions will focus on MEDCAP and ENCAP programs. Security force assistance programs have proven themselves effective across all of the GCCs and are adequately utilized.

Delimitations for this paper include not covering the entire African continent, particularly the South African region. While problems of stability do exist in this region of Africa, the country of South Africa is a well-established governance structure to deal with security cooperation missions. South Africa is considered more stabilized than other African countries in the Western, Northern and Eastern Horn of Africa regions due to a stabilized governance infrastructure.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the USAFRICOM AOR and identified the requirement for U.S. involvement with Phase Zero Shaping Operations in order to

maintain and advance national security objectives. The primary and secondary research questions will assist with framing how to answer these questions while taking into account assumptions, limitations and delimitation. The next chapter, chapter 2, will review the literature for security cooperation missions and provide an assessment of the significance of the literature to this study; it will determine if there are specific types of security cooperation missions that should be conducted with African partnered nations. The remaining chapters of this study will cover the methodology, analyses of the findings, and recommended solutions to the types of security cooperation missions that should be conducted on the African continent.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Our expanding operational requirements and their associated opportunity costs make it vitally important that we align resources with priorities across the globe, strengthen and leverage partnerships, and further enhance our operational flexibility.

— General David M. Rodriguez, Commander USAFRICOM, March 5, 2014

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review literature from various civilian and military organizations that will help to answer the primary research question—"Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions in the African continent?" The literature review will help identify security cooperation missions in Africa and to determine if these are the correct types of security cooperation missions to conduct in the African continent. Review of this literature will identify key facts and assumptions that will later be used for analyses.

Definition and Response to Security Cooperation Missions

The review of literature for this study is important to research material at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to determine what type of theater security operations should be conducted in Africa. The following literature reviews will be conducted for this study.

At the strategic level, it will be necessary to review literature that will allow the author to gain a perspective and a general understanding of the types of security cooperation operations that are conducted by the United States. The African Growth

Initiative at the Brookings Institute publishes articles that outline the importance of Africa and what the African continent provides for U.S. interests. The Africa Growth Initiative brings together African scholars, policymakers, and many experts on the African continent to collaborate and develop information that can be shared by government and private organizations to better understand Africa. A publication written by the Brookings Institute in March 2013 entitled *Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States*, provides data for how U.S. national security objectives can be met in Africa. In this document, the authors identify five key areas on why Africa is important to U.S. interests: U.S. national security, the increasing role of China in Africa, Africa's energy needs for U.S. foreign policy, U.S. trade and investment, and U.S. development assistance. Another institution that provides scholarly work is the *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. This online-based site is a DoD sponsored institution for strategic security studies, research, and outreach in Africa. The Africa center engages African partner states and institutions through rigorous academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term, collaborative relationships. The mission of the Africa Center is to, “support United States foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic values, and safeguard human rights” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2015). The Africa Center organizes programs that are complex in nature and require collaboration in order to achieve solutions that can be published and provided to DoD, government, and civilian agencies. There is a limited amount of scholarly literature that discusses security cooperation programs. However, there are substantial policy documents that provide

insight to security cooperation programs and how these programs are used to achieve national security interests. The current *National Security Strategy* dated February 2015 and 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* provide the starting point for the types of security operations missions that should be conducted in Africa. The current *National Security Strategy* covers four key areas that serve as the way-ahead for how the U.S. will meet its national security objectives: *Security, Prosperity, Values, and International Order*. The African continent is tied into all four of these areas and is specifically addressed under International Order in that national security objectives will *Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa and Invest in Africa's Future* (Obama 2015, 26). The 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* outlines the emergence of global powers that will shift efforts to empower smaller countries and non-state actors, and private citizens that will in turn have a direct impact on global economies and regional stability. Africa is one of these regions that will be at the center stage (Department of Defense 2014, 25).

At the operational level, it will be necessary to review literature that narrows down to geographic combatant commands, particularly USPACOM and USAFRICOM. The Congressional Testimony of the Commander, USAFRICOM, and the other GCCs will provide a guideline for the types of security cooperation missions that U.S. forces should be conducting in Africa. The testimony of each individual combatant commander provides an assessment that supports a qualitative study to this paper.

In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the Commander of USAFRICOM, General Rodriguez, addressed that, "We believe efforts to meet security challenges in Africa are best led and conducted by African partners. We work with partners to ensure our military efforts support and complement comprehensive

solutions to security challenges that leverage all elements of national and international power, including civilian efforts to gradually strengthen governance, justice and the rule of law.” General Rodriguez goes on to address that security cooperation is the key to executing military activities to support national security objectives in the Africa AOR (Rodriguez 2014, 5).

The Commander of USEUCOM, General Breedlove, addressed in his testimony to the SASC that USEUCOM has experienced significant changes to the overall security of the European continent and that global security cooperation is one of the many shared values that USEUCOM is trying to provide (Breedlove 2015, 5). USEUCOM relies on security cooperation programs to build stability in its AOR and works with DSCA to develop authorities that will enable the U.S. to support security cooperation missions (Breedlove 2015, 23).

The Commander of USPACOM, Admiral Locklear, addressed in his testimony to the SASC that USPACOM continues to balance partnership with the U.S. and other nations in the Pacific region and has seen significant gains in its security cooperation activities. USPACOM with its unique character of a large AOR covered mostly by water has a long history of building and strengthening relationships through security cooperation and capacity building. USPACOM’s approach to security cooperation programs is to focus on building partner readiness, assisting with partner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing the most critical capacity shortfalls (Locklear 2015, 16-20).

The commander of USSOUTHCOM, General Kelly, addressed in his testimony to the SASC that USSOUTHCOM relies heavily on security cooperation activities to build

partnerships in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. With competing and reduced operating budgets, the value of security cooperation missions will be even more important and integrated into joint and combined operational exercises such as “Beyond the Horizon” that is a humanitarian and civic assistance field training exercise that combined military training with five ENCAP projects to enhance building partnership capacity (Kelly 2015, 32).

The commander of USCENTCOM, General Austin, in his testimony to the SASC addresses that one of the priority focuses is to, “Develop and execute security cooperation programs that will improve bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered ‘capacities’ and improving information sharing, security, and stability” (Austin 2015, 9). USCENTCOM faces a unique challenge because this GCC has been the primary focus of DoD efforts over the past decade and will now be required to build and strengthen its security cooperation program. The current USCENTCOM Joint Exercise and Training Program will be utilized to extend participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR in order to execute robust exercise programs and meet USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives (Austin 2015, 39).

The Commander of USNORTHCOM, Admiral Gortney, in his testimony to the SASC addresses that while USNORTHCOM has a very limited scope of security cooperation missions, USNORTHCOM continues to highly value security cooperation partnerships and utilizes these types of missions as an instrumental tool to achieve building partnership capacity (Gortney 2015, 20).

In order to compare the types of security cooperation missions that the GCCs conduct in 2014, data will be captured from the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance

Support Information Systems (OHASIS) database. OHASIS enables Humanitarian Assistance offices, including Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to manage the full life cycle of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects. OHASIS provides this data to all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) for their use in monitoring humanitarian assistance projects and to DOS members throughout the world for nominating projects. The OHASIS system is currently used to manage the full life cycle of over 3,000 OHDACA projects each fiscal year. OHASIS provides a mechanism for the United States Government to share their appropriate releasable DoD HA information to other organizations, to include both governmental and non-governmental organizations (Army GeoSpatial Center 2015).

There is a limited availability of scholarly literature for security cooperation programs. Data will be evaluated from the Brookings Institute African Growth Initiative and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Data will also be evaluated from U.S. government policy statements to gain a perspective of the current environment on the African continent and how security cooperation missions are currently conducted by USAFRICOM and the other GCCs. The data evaluated will be compared against the other GCCs and provide a breakdown of the types of security cooperation programs being conducted.

Conclusion

Review of this literature helps frame how to answer the question of identifying security cooperation missions in Africa and to determine if these are the correct types of security cooperation missions to conduct in the African continent. Providing definitions

and responses to security cooperation missions will allow for the information and data researched to be placed against evaluation criteria and apply the literature against a methodology. The next chapter in this study, chapter 3, will explain the methodology and approach for how security cooperation missions will be analyzed and presented in their current operating states.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

If I had an hour to solve a problem I'd spend 55 minutes thinking about the problem and 5 minutes thinking of solutions.

— Albert Einstein

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to apply research methodology to the literature review that was discussed in the previous chapter to answer the primary research question—"Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions in the African continent?" The methodology will continue to answer the question of identifying security cooperation missions in Africa and to determine if these are the correct types of security cooperation missions to conduct on the African continent. A qualitative study was conducted to capture past and current security cooperation missions being conducted in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. These types of missions were compared to other GCCs across the globe. The following methodology is utilized to conduct this research: historical investigation, comparative study, the Cynefin Framework, and the Kotter Change Model.

Historical and Comparative Study Methods

The historical investigation method involves comparing previous security cooperation missions that were conducted in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and comparing it to other GCCs. This information will be collected and grouped by calendar and fiscal years to show the rise or decline of the total number of security cooperation

missions that were conducted. For this research, security cooperation mission data was obtained from the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information Systems (OHASIS) that is managed by the U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center and works with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and each of the GCCs, to collect and share data on security cooperation missions that are conducted across the world. This paper will analyze security cooperation missions that were conducted in calendar year 2014. This data will also be divided into the specific types of security cooperation missions to show if there is a frequency trend of one mission over the other. The comparative study method uses the information gathered from historical investigation to see if particular types of security cooperation missions are conducted more frequently than others. This will also be compared against the total number of missions that are conducted each calendar, or fiscal, year. The data will also be compared from USAFRICOM security cooperation missions against the security cooperation missions conducted in another geographic combatant command—the USPACOM area of responsibility.

Models for Identification and Change

The Cynefin Framework is a way to assist leaders with understanding complex environments and serves as a means to understand and apply best solutions to these complex environments by using known and unknowns as delineators. David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone diagrams (see figure 4) explain how environments are categorized into four types: complex, complicated, chaotic, and simple. As seen in the diagram, there is a fifth category labeled “disorder” that exists when the type of environment is indiscernible. A complex environment will consist of multiple numbers of interacting

elements and has no particular order. These interacting elements have no set relation to one another, and minor changes in one interaction may create major consequences in another interaction. The complex environment is dynamic and usually must be probed in order to identify viable solutions. In the complicated environment, there may be multiple correct answers and solutions that will have a clear relationship between the cause and effect, but not all parties involved may understand or see the causes and effects. Leaders working in a complicated environment must analyze and respond to problems with the assistance of subject matter experts in a particular field. In the chaotic environment, there is a constant shift between cause and effect; set patterns do not exist for determining solutions. Leaders working in the chaotic environment do not have time to probe or analyze; instead, they must first take action in order to establish stability and then transfer the problem into the complex environment. The simple environment is best described as stable and has clear cause and effect relationships that are easily identified by everyone involved. In this environment, leaders and organizations make straightforward decisions to manage by delegation and straightforward actions. The fifth and final environment is disorder. In the disorder environment, leaders cannot identify if they are in one of the four other environments. While some situations may appear simple, these situations can easily turn into a complicated situation that will spiral into a continuous chaotic, complex and complicated environment all at once. During disorder, leaders can rely on the Cynefin Model to determine if there is a more predominate environment over another (Snowden and Boone 2007, 2). In this study, there are complicated, complex, and chaotic environments within the relationships between the U.S. and African partner nations when it comes to building security cooperation capacity.



Figure 4. The Cynefin Framework

Source: Department of Leadership, L203- *Leading Organizations in Change* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, February 10, 2015), slide 5.

Once the type of environment is identified, there are various methods that can be applied to revise or implement a new strategy. This is a delicate balance because the U.S. must be careful not to force its will on partnering African countries.

The Kotter Change Model is one approach for how to provide a solution on how USAFRICOM and partnering African countries can implement change in Phase Zero operations if there is a better program. In his book, *Leading Change*, John Kotter provides eight characteristics for why change fails and proposes an eight-step process for leading change within an organization (see figure 5).

The first characteristic for why change fails is that organizations do not establish, or put enough emphasis on, a sense of urgency. When an organization is forced to operate under timeline constraints, employees will tend to work together in a team environment

to provide solutions and results. Most organizations do not have time constraints levied against them so employees and management tend to isolate themselves and lose the teamwork atmosphere. This can be placed against the current DoD and DOS structure that is currently in place on the African continent. With USAFRICOM attempting to increase and expand its security cooperation missions, it must deal with a slower paced DOS mind-set that is present in the U.S. Embassies in Africa.

The second characteristic is that organizations do not create powerful enough guiding coalitions. Many programs begin with one or two key individuals and they must work with their counterparts to form a coalition to ensure the success of the program and organization. If a new, or renewed, program does not have coalition support than the program may not survive and will appear weak and applicable to the organization. This characteristic can again be placed against the current USAFRICOM, DOS, and African partner nation's structure to show that there are competing interests that derail the possibility of creating powerful coalitions.

The third characteristic is the lack of a vision. In order to get an organization to work together and be efficient, leadership must provide a vision that will direct and guide the organization towards a common list of objectives and goals. Organizations will sometimes provide too little, too much, or outdated vision statements that set off a domino effect within an organization. This characteristic can again be placed against the internal structures and operating procedures of USAFRICOM, U.S. Embassies, and African partner nations to show that a lack of vision from leadership provides friction and lack of external focus on accomplishing security cooperation missions.

The fourth characteristic is under-communicating the vision by a factor of ten. An organization will provide a vision but there is no follow-through by management to ensure that everyone within the organization understands what the focus of effort should be. This characteristic will be applied against how USAFRICOM provides guidance through their operational approach but the vision does not get communicated down to the tactical level for execution of security cooperation missions.

The fifth characteristic is not removing obstacles to the new vision. As an example, even organizations release a new vision, as a whole does not recognize that other changes within the organization must take place. For example, an organization will release a new vision for more efficient operations but the current organization structure does not support this new vision; members of management refuse to change the current organizational structure. This characteristic can identify that organizations are not changing out of date procedures and policies for how to conduct security cooperation missions on the African continent.

The sixth characteristic is not planning for or creating short-term wins. A complete transformation will take place over a period of time that can range from 12 to 24 months. Sometimes not all members of an organization will notice any change or will begin to lose focus or commitment to the new vision. By applying this characteristic to USAFRICOM security cooperation program, creating short-term wins for executing a combination of security cooperation programs across the Africa AOR can establish a foundation for a successful long-term program.

The seventh characteristic is declaring victory too soon. After years of running a successful program, organizations will tend to become complacent because of their

current successes. This characteristic can be applied to this paper because it can identify how USAFRICOM can report short-term wins but not have the ability to transition security cooperation programs to long-term programs.

The eighth and final characteristic for why organizations fail at change is because they do not anchor changes in the organizations culture. Organizations will sometimes lose focus on instilling their culture when business is successful and will rely on management to carry on the organizational culture. Anchoring changes to an organization's culture involves showing members how changes have bettered the organization by linking past and current accomplishments to future endeavors. Other factors affecting culture change are allocating the time and resources to ensure that future generations of leaders within an organization are properly trained and vested for the future success of the organization. This characteristic will be applied against how USAFRICOM and U.S. Embassies in Africa train their personnel on how to plan and execute security cooperation missions as long-term programs.

To correct the failing characteristics of an organization, Kotter applies his eight steps for leading change within an organization; these steps align with the previous characteristics listed above. The first step is to establish a sense of urgency by identifying an existing or potential crises, and major opportunities for change. The second step is to form a powerful guiding coalition. Senior leaders need to assemble a group with enough power that can lead a change effort. It is up to this coalition to get the entire organization to work together. The third step is to create a vision that will help direct the change effort and further develop a strategy to achieve this vision. The fourth step is to communicate the vision. Utilizing all informational tools available to communicate and teach, both

internally and externally, the new vision does this. The fifth step is to empower others to act on the vision. This step entails removing obstacles that will stop or slow down change, and/or changing structures or systems that will discredit the vision. Another successful technique is to encourage employees to take risk and come up with nontraditional ideas and actions to implement change. The sixth step is to plan and create short-term wins. Planning and creating short-term wins will show visible performance improvements and reward employees involved with these improvements. The seventh step is to consolidate improvements and produce more change. Reinventing processes with new projects to include hiring and promoting knowledgeable individuals who can implement change does this. The eighth, and final, step to transforming an organization is to institutionalize new approaches. This includes illustrating and demonstrating the links between new behavior and organizations success. Most importantly, this step involves expending resources on leadership development and success for the long term.

This Kotter Change Model will be beneficial when reviewing how certain types of security cooperation missions, such as medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) and engineer civic action programs (ENCAPs), have become complacent and may have led to the increased Ebola outbreak in Liberia in recent years. The Kotter Model will provide solutions for how USAFRICOM can implement change in how it conducts security cooperation missions on the African continent. The Cynefin Framework can be used to identify the environment created by the recent Ebola outbreak in Liberia, and its impact on U.S. agencies and partnering African countries.




Figure 5. John Kotter: Sources of Complacency; Stages for Change

Source: Department of Leadership, L203, *Leading Organizations in Change* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, February 10, 2015), slide 15.

Evaluating Security Cooperation Missions

Evaluation criteria are created to provide an assessment on how effective a solution can be. For this paper, the following criteria in Table 1 have been developed to assist with determining if certain types of security cooperation missions are valid and effective. There are four key criteria that will be used to assess security cooperation missions in Africa. The first criteria is based on the type of security cooperation mission that is being conducted. Security cooperation missions generally fit into one of three categories: MEDCAPs, security training, or ENCAPs. A diversified mix of these types of security cooperation missions is better for broadening the interoperability between multinational and African partner nations. The second is based on the sustainability of security cooperation missions.

The more frequent security cooperation missions are conducted, the greater the results and effectiveness will become. The third criteria is based on the participation of multi-national support to African countries. More international participation will build a wider array of partnerships and enable the maximum amount of resources to be applied to African countries. The fourth, and most important, criterion is based on host-nation support. In order for security cooperation missions to be successful on the African continent, it is important to have the host-nations fully participating with international partner nations. If host-nations are not allocating the maximum amount of resources to security cooperation missions, they will not reap the benefits that multi-national partners are providing. Having a long-term, open-ended agreement between host-nation and multi-national partners will establish better relationships and enable security cooperation missions to thrive. Host-nation countries will have the flexibility to allocate more personnel and resources to security cooperation missions if they are able to plan years in advance without having to worry about starting over with planning and legal parameters that are required to coordinate security cooperation missions every year.

Criteria	Good	Better	Best
Types of Missions	One of the following missions: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Security Assistance Training- Medical Civil Action Program- Engineer Civil Action Program	Two of the following missions: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Security Assistance Training- Medical Civil Action Program- Engineer Civil Action Program	All of the following missions: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Security Assistance Training- Medical Civil Action Program- Engineer Civil Action Program
Sustainability	Security cooperation missions are conducted every two years	Security cooperation missions are conducted annually	Security cooperation missions are conducted semi-annually
Multi-National Support	A minimum of two Nations participate in security cooperation missions	A minimum of three Nations participate in security cooperation missions	Three or more Nations participate in security cooperation missions
Host-Nation Support	Limited agreement between Host-Nation and participating Nation(s)	One year agreement between Host-Nation and participating Nation(s)	Five year plus open-end agreement between Host-Nation and participating Nation(s)

Table 1. Evaluation Criteria: Security Cooperation Missions in Africa

Source: Created by author.

Methodological Approach

In order to conduct thorough research on this topic, there must be a step-by-step research design approach that will allow the reader to understand how the primary research question will be answered. The following seven-step research design approach will be used throughout this paper.

Step 1: The first step in the research design is to conduct a research of material that encompasses how the U.S. performs its security cooperation programs and its involvement on the African continent. There is also a review of security cooperation missions and programs that assist with building partner capacity with partner nations across the globe to illustrate how USAFRICOM compares against the other GCCs.

Step 2: The second step in the research design is to collect data from the research and apply it against the Cynefin Model (see figure 4) to identify what is the current

environment for building partnership capacity on the African continent both internally and externally to U.S. agencies that currently operate in the Africa AOR and identifying where in the five areas of the Cynefin Model these current operations fall under.

Step 3: The third step in the research design is to take the data and findings from the Cynefin Model and apply these to the Kotter Complacency and Eight Step Change Model (see figure 5) to provide a recommended solution for providing organizational change to the current framework for USAFRICOM and Africa partner nations.

Step 4: The fourth step in the research design is to take the data gathered in the research and apply these against all of the GCCs to identify the total number of security cooperation missions that are conducted in each GCC AOR. In addition, the total amount of resources allocated to security cooperation missions in each GCC are broken down by percentage. The overall number of security cooperation missions will be broken down into specific types of missions (i.e., MEDCAPs, ENCAPs . . . etc.) to provide a comparison within each GCC.

Step 5: The fifth step in the research design is to take the data from the research; the findings from Cynefin and Kotter Models; the data from overall security cooperation missions conducted by each GCC; and apply this information against the Evaluation Criteria (see table 1) to determine USAFRICOM is conducting an effective security cooperation program.

Step 6: The sixth step in the research design is to answer the primary research question-“Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions in the African continent?” This question will be answered with a direct yes or

no response and will include caveats should the direct response require to be expanded upon.

Step 7: The seventh, and final, step in the research design is to provide conclusions of the data researched and applied in the previous steps and to provide recommendations on how USAFRICOM can improve its current security cooperation programs on the African continent.

Threats to Validity

During this research, there are two key threats to validity with the methodology approach that must be addressed. First, the author is a service member in the Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps. All references to U.S. Army security cooperation missions are not based off of first-hand experience with the U.S. Army; these are reviewed and validated through U.S. Army Doctrine or reports that have been released for review. Second, the author has six-years of operational experience with security cooperation missions in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility. The author must understand that the U.S. PACOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility have different social, religious and geographical dynamics-some of these security cooperation missions may not work in another geographic combatant command location.

Conclusion

By applying historical and comparative study methods and applying these methods to models for identification and change, while taking into account the threats to validity of the material, will provide the accurate methodology to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The next chapter in this study, chapter 4, will utilize

historical investigation, comparative study, and the Cynefin Framework to determine what problems currently exist in the USAFRICOM security cooperation missions. The Kotter Change Model will then be applied to identify the complacency of these problems and propose recommended changes to the security cooperation missions on the African Continent utilizing the model's eight stages of leading change.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS

Every morning in Africa, a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the fastest lion or it will be killed. Every morning a lion wakes up. It knows it must outrun the slowest gazelle or it will starve to death. It doesn't matter whether you are a lion or a gazelle: when the sun comes up, you'd better be running.

— African Proverb

Introduction

This chapter will present the facts and findings with an analysis of the material that was reviewed to answer the primary research question—"Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions on the African continent?" In addition to identifying the types of security cooperation missions that are being conducted in Africa, this paper will analyze if these are the correct (i.e., the most effective) types of security cooperation missions to conduct. These facts will establish a starting point to determine if the correct types of security cooperation missions are being conducted to support Phase Zero operations with African partnered nations on the African Continent. The material will be broken out by the following areas: the present environment, the desired environment, the problems currently facing security cooperation missions, and a depiction of the operational approach that is currently established.

Present Environment

There are currently five areas that the U.S. considers key threats on the African continent: illegal trafficking, terrorism, political unrest and weapons proliferation, illicit trafficking and piracy, and instability (USAFRICOM 2014, 10). Illegal trafficking is

primarily focused in West Africa. Terrorist activity is a problem in Western and Northern Africa with Boko Haram, and in Western Africa with Al Qai’da. Political unrest and weapons proliferation is a problem in Northern Africa with the lack of governance in countries such as Libya and Chad. Illicit trafficking and piracy is a consistent problem in Western Africa, primarily in the Horn of Africa region. There is a concentration of instability in Central Africa with the March 23rd Rebellion Movement, also referred to “M23”. USAFRICOM conducted an array of exercises and operations to counter these five threats in calendar year (CY) 2014 (see figure 6). During CY 2014 USAFRICOM conducted 55 operations, 10 exercises, and 481 security cooperation missions (Rodriguez 2014, 3). The breakdowns for these security cooperation missions conducted within the USAFRICOM AOR are provided in Appendix A. The supporting Tabs to Appendix A provide a breakdown of the types of security cooperation missions (i.e., MEDCAPs, ENCAPs) that were conducted within the USAFRICOM AOR. Another area that is not addressed in the USAFRICOM laydown of threats, but has caught the world’s attention over the past year, is the health crisis with the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa. USAFRICOM does provide security cooperation missions that focus on medical training; however, these medical training missions did not make enough of an impact to prevent the recent Ebola outbreak. The level of assistance to stabilize this health crisis was not achieved until the Department of Defense (DoD) deployed a large military task force in 2014 to assist with the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.

From an economic perspective, the African economy in the current environment is heavily involved with the international market from countries like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the European Union. The U.S. market has failed to engage in large and

enduring business and is missing out on economic opportunities with African countries that will help lead to economic, health, and security stability across the five African regions (Schneidman 2013, 12).




Figure 6. U.S. Africa Command Operational Overview

Source: U.S. Africa Command, “Command Overview Brief,” October 22, 2014, Slide 11, accessed November 13, 2014, <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/documents>.

When comparing the total number of security cooperation missions that USAFRICOM conducted in fiscal year 2014 with the other GCC's, USAFRICOM ranked third across the GCC's (see tables 2 and 3). A security cooperation mission is classified as an event, regardless of the size of the force participating, with a foreign partner nation.

A security cooperation mission can be a 10-person team that conducts training or a larger unit, such as a company size, that conducts larger projects. This classification of a security cooperation mission serves as a metric that will answer a measure of performance and the primary research question. The DoD conducted a total of 1,833 missions. USAFRICOM conducted a total number of 306 or 17 percent of security cooperation missions that were executed during the fiscal year. A majority, over 55 percent, of the USAFRICOM security cooperation missions conducted were MEDCAPs and ENCAPs with the additional execution of Education, Mine Assistance, and miscellaneous missions (see Appendix A). USPACOM ranked first and executed the most security cooperation missions with a total of 631, which is 34 percent of all security cooperation missions. A majority of USPACOM missions were also MEDCAPs and ENCAPs. Given USPACOM's geographical and environmental factors, their miscellaneous missions exceeded 193 missions due to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions (see Appendix C). USPACOM also has a mature theater that has allowed this GCC to build capacity and long-term partnerships. USSOUTHCOM had the second highest number of security cooperation missions with a total number of 550 or 30 percent of the DoD total security cooperation missions. The majority of the missions conducted were also MEDCAPs and ENCAPs. USEUCOM had the fourth highest number of security cooperation missions, after USAFRICOM that is ranked third, with a total number of 231 missions that was 14 percent of the DoD total missions. A majority of the missions conducted were ENCAPs and Education support. The number of MEDCAPs was lower for USEUCOM because of the infrastructure that is already in place for the European nations (see Appendix B). USCENTCOM has the fifth highest

number with a total of 89 security cooperation missions that accounted for five percent overall for the DoD. A majority of the missions conducted were MEDCAPs and Education support missions. USNORTHCOM ranked sixth, and last, against all of the GCCs with 26 total missions, and one percent of the DoD total. This low number is due to the USNORTHCOM AOR being restricted by the U.S. homeland and stability of Canada and Mexico.

While there is a significant difference between the total numbers of missions executed in fiscal year 2014, the five GCCs were consistent with a heavy volume of MEDCAP and ENCAP missions. Appendixes A through E provide the detailed breakdown of the total number of security cooperation missions and further categorizes these types of missions that were conducted within each GCC AOR. Because of USNORTHCOM's unique character of operating within the continental U.S. and having a stable AOR that includes Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas, the total numbers of USNORTHCOM security cooperation missions are significantly less than the other GCCs and will not be addressed in detail in this paper. USNORTHCOM conducted a total of 26 security cooperation missions and accounted for only five percent of the total security cooperation missions conducted by DoD. The overall numbers for USNORTHCOM are included in table 2 and figure 7 of this paper to illustrate how all of the GCCs compare against each other.

Country Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM	306	\$75,502,429.62	\$3,819,644.39
CENTCOM	89	\$22,524,103.53	\$2,919,864.10
EUCOM	231	\$32,457,444.00	\$3,218,605.74
NORTHCOM	26	\$3,015,441.00	\$583,022.35
PACOM	631	\$103,086,892.31	\$16,284,174.06
SOUTHCOM	550	\$66,677,898.65	\$14,100,038.32

Table 2. Geographical Combatant Commands Overall Security Cooperation Missions fiscal year 2014

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 15, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/.aspx?COCOM>.




Figure 7. Geographical Combatant Commands Distribution of Security Cooperation Missions in fiscal year 2014

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 15, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/.aspx?COCOM>.

There is insufficient data when it comes to evaluating the measures of effectiveness for security cooperation programs across all of the GCCs during FY 2014. No data can be found that captures how effective security cooperation missions are once they have concluded. The GCCs develop after action reports and capture security cooperation programs in command chronology reports, but there is no report that conveys how MEDCAP and ENCAP missions affected the host nation. Further research needs to be conducted to evaluate measures of effectiveness against DoD security cooperation programs.

There is sufficient data available to review the measures of performance for security cooperation programs conducted by USAFRICOM. The amount of resources, in the form of programmed funding, is used to capture security cooperation programs across the GCCs during fiscal year 2014. The number of personnel and participating units in security cooperation programs were not available. Figure 8 provides the funding and percentage breakdown for the types of security cooperation programs that were executed across the GCCs during FY 2014. The combined programmed funding for MEDCAP and ENCAP missions showed that three of the GCCs gave priority to MEDCAP and ENCAP missions: USSOUTHCOM (85 percent), USAFRICOM (75 percent), and USPACOM (60 percent). Two of the GCCs provided a more balanced priority to MEDCAP and ENCAP missions: USEUCOM (50 percent), and USCENTCOM (44 percent).

USAFRICOM programmed 75 percent, \$56.4 million, of its security cooperation program budget to MEDCAP and ENCAP missions in order to build partnership capacity

in regions where the risk of pandemic outbreak and instability continues to jeopardize national security objectives on the African continent.




Figure 8. Security Cooperation Programs by Type in fiscal year 2014

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 15, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/.aspx?COCOM>.

The total number of projects that are provided in Table 2 differs from the number of security cooperation missions that were referenced earlier in the testimony that the Commander USAFRICOM provided to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee. In his testimony, the Commander USAFRICOM provided the overall number

of security cooperation missions that were covered in the USAFRICOM AOR during calendar year 2014 and not the fiscal year that has been used in the research of this paper.

Desired Environment

For the U.S., the desired environment on the African Continent is an enduring pursuit of effective security cooperation missions that fall within a much broader scope of U.S. Government participation by applying the following instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. By providing a broader scope of U.S. Government participation, this will increase the breadth of participation amongst multinational partnering nations (Rodriguez 2014, 3). Multi-national partners would like to see African countries take on more of a lead role in stabilizing their continent since they had previously established the African Union in calendar year 2002. Since its establishment, the African Union has made incremental change but has struggled to the long-term partnership building capacity that it has hoped to achieve due to the instability across the five African regions.

By applying the Kotter Change Model to the desired environment, USAFRICOM can take the lead to establish a way forward that will create a more fluid relationship between the DOS and African partner nations that will implement a security cooperation program that will be long-term. Establishing a sense of urgency to develop a long-term security cooperation program across all five regions in Africa will lead to the development of a guiding coalition between USAFRICOM, DOS, and African partner nations. This guiding coalition can develop a common vision and strategy that will empower broad-based action within all three organizations. By using the step of creating short-term wins, USAFRICOM, in conjunction with DOS and Africa partner nations, can

develop a certain number of annual re-occurring security cooperation missions that will produce immediate results and continue to build a guiding coalition for future larger projects that can be planned over a five year period. These short-term wins will also lead to a review and update to the overall vision of how security cooperation programs can better achieve national security objectives.

Problems Currently Facing Security Cooperation Missions

The African continent remains in a state of fragile stability due to persistent poverty conditions, inequality, lack of governance, inadequate security, and public health concerns (Bellamy 2009, 1). The continuing instability along the international borders and piracy around the Horn of Africa destabilizes these two regions. Inadequate coordination and planning, for a health crisis such as the recent Ebola outbreak in Western Africa, continues to keep African countries in a reactive state and unable to surge ahead.

Applying the Cynefin Model to the present environment shows that the relationship between USAFRICOM, U.S. Embassies, and African partner nations revolve between a “complex, complicated, and disorder” environments. The relationship between all three of these organizations makes the situation complex due to the interaction between foreign governments. The relationship between U.S. only agencies, such as USAFRICOM and DOS remain complicated due the bureaucracy that takes place between these two government agencies. The delicate balance between the complex and complicated environments spiral into disorder when situations such as the recent Ebola pandemic breakout in 2014 take place and all three organizations cannot function together.

Depiction of the Operational Approach

In order for USAFRICOM to achieve its objectives for security cooperation with African nations, there must be a strategy devised that will show security cooperation missions will be conducted. The current operational approach (see Figure 9) identifies five end states: African governments counter to Al Qaeda Affiliates and Adherent groups' intent and capability, U.S. maintains assured access and freedom of movement, Africans combat transnational threats, Africans conduct peace and crisis operations, and Africans develop professional militaries subordinate to civilian control. In order to achieve these five end states, USAFRICOM has outlined six lines of effort: counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their networks, support defense institution building, assured access and freedom of movement, maritime security, counter illicit trafficking, and peacekeeping and crisis response.




Figure 9. U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Concept

Source: U.S. Africa Command, “Command Overview Brief,” October 22, 2014, Slide Slide 10, accessed November 13, 2014, <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/documents>.

Conclusions

Based off of the presentation of facts and analyses in this chapter, the primary research question can now be answered. Based on the research, the United States is conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions on the African continent. However, the determination of this primary research question has three caveats. First, that every GCC is different due to the specific U.S. interest of each region. Second, that there is insufficient data and further research will need to be conducted to evaluate the measures of effectiveness against security cooperation programs for each GCC in order to

make a better comparison. Third, that USAFRICOM must execute a more balanced approach to security cooperation missions on the African continent.

The final chapter in this study, chapter 5, will provide a summary of conclusions on the types of security cooperation missions that are being conducted in Africa and if these are the correct types of security cooperation missions to conduct. Recommended changes for how security cooperation missions should be conducted in Africa will also be proposed.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Africa's resilience and creativity are enormous. We have a rising and energetic youth population. Our dynamic entrepreneurs are using technology to transform people's lives. We have enough resources to feed not just ourselves but other regions, too. It is time for Africa's leaders- and responsible investment partners- to unlock this huge potential.

— Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary General

Introduction

The purpose of this paper was to answer the question-“Is the United States conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions on the African continent?” In addition to this primary research question, there were secondary research questions that identified deficiencies and compared the difference of security cooperation programs between USAFRICOM and the other GCC’s. The conclusions reached in this paper have important implications for U.S. national security objectives on the African continent. Their conclusions are recommendations that will help enhance USAFRICOM building partner capacity, and meeting national security objectives with African partner nations.

Conclusions

This study determined that the United States is conducting the correct types of security cooperation missions on the African continent with a caveat that USAFRICOM must execute a more balanced approach to security cooperation missions. The following five conclusions that impact security cooperation mission in Africa were reached.

First, that USAFRICOM ranks third and accounts for 17 percent of the overall DoD security cooperation missions when compared against the other GCCs in fiscal year

2014. While USAFRICOM has the capability to plan and execute security cooperation missions on the African continent, greater resources and a more balanced approach throughout the continent could potentially enhance their security cooperation programs. One potential way to approach gaining this balance would be to use the blueprint that USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM use for their respective security cooperation programs.

Second, that the number and types of security cooperation missions being executed on the African continent are similar to those security cooperation missions that are being conducted in the other geographic combatant command AORs. This demonstrates that USAFRICOM-and the other GCCs-placed emphasis and allocation of resources on MEDCAP and ENCAP missions.

Third, that security cooperation missions conducted in the USAFRICOM AOR are designed to meet short-term security objectives and are not planned to meet long-term national security objectives. By not planning and executing security cooperation missions to meet long-term security objectives, this results in added time and resources to plan for MEDCAPs and ENCAPS that could be executed more efficiently if planned for the long-term during initial operations.

Fourth, that USAFRICOM is establishing building partnership capacity with African partner nations through security cooperation missions. Establishing building partnership capacity promotes a relationship and familiarization of governments and militaries that enables USAFRICOM quicker accessibility into Africa partner nations in the event that military operations are elevated to “Phase I–Deter,” or “Phase II–Seize the initiative” operations. This will prove valuable in the event of a disaster or pandemic response.

Fifth, that USAFRICOM does not have the proper distribution and allocation of security cooperation missions among the five African regions with USAFRICOM. This suggests that African countries in direct need of assistance, such as the Western Africa region, do not receive the adequate number of MEDCAP and ENCAP missions.

The methodological approach used for this paper showed that the Cynefin and Kotter Models were able to identify problems with the way security cooperation programs are conducted in the Africa AOR. However, the Cynefin and Kotter Models were not able to provide viable solutions on how create a fluid environment in which the U.S. agencies and Africa partnered nations can work more efficiently on security cooperation programs. These two models might be useful for further research on security cooperation programs in Africa because they will provide a better understanding to identify the types of environments and recommend changes once more data is available.

Recommendations

Based off of the five conclusions listed earlier in this section, these are recommendations that provide for a way ahead for USAFRICOM to consider for improving how to plan and conduct security cooperation missions. The following five recommendations are provided.

First, while national security objectives have placed an emphasis on the shift to the Pacific, USAFRICOM must maintain its current DoD budget levels to sustain its ability to execute security cooperation missions in the African continent while competing against future interests of USPACOM. By utilizing the U.S. Army's Regionally Aligned Forces concept, USAFRICOM can take advantage of deploying U.S. forces more

frequently to Africa partner nations that will in turn provide stability and increase the frequency and effectiveness of security cooperation missions over the next decade.

Second, that planning and after action reports from other GCCs, particularly USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM, must be reviewed and evaluated by USAFRICOM to see if current security cooperation programs can be applied to the Africa AOR. Both USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM have decades of experience in conducting security cooperation missions in their respective AORs. USAFRICOM can work through Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to coordinate and implement a DoD wide program that improves security cooperation missions across the GCCs.

Third, USAFRICOM must work with U.S. Embassies to coordinate with African partner nations to enter into long-term, security cooperation missions that will enable a more efficient way to plan, deploy, execute, and redeploy USAFRICOM forces. Having a long-term plan for security cooperation missions can expand on current MEDCAP and ENCAP missions so that these type operations can execute a broader scope of mission tasks that can deal with preventing pandemic outbreaks or increasing facilities and transportation nodes that can be interrelated.

Fourth, that USAFRICOM continues with current partner nations and seeks out new building partnership capacity opportunities with African partner nations across all of the African regions. Involving partner nations outside of Africa to participate in a rotational cycle that continuously executes security cooperation programs can accomplish this.

Fifth, USAFRICOM must coordinate and work more closely with the U.S. Embassies in each of the African nations to promote a greater distribution of security

cooperation missions so that there is a balance of MEDCAP and ENCAP missions across all of the Africa regions. This will improve the relationship between USAFRICOM, U.S. Embassies, and host nations in preparing for future disaster, pandemic, and/or security response operations.

Based off of these five key recommendations, further research will need to be conducted in order to evaluate the measures of effectiveness associated with security cooperation programs against the GCCs.

Closing Thoughts

The African continent consists of over 11,700,000 square miles of landmass that can fit within the African continent the entire countries of China, the U.S., India, Argentina, New Zealand and the European continent minus Russia and Turkey (Krabacher et al. 2009, 5). The African continent is an economy on the rise and holds a vast amount of natural resources that will become important to the global economy in the decades to come. However, the African continent continues to be plagued by instability that ranges from security, economic, civil and health concerns. There has also been an increase in violence due to multiple extremist organizations.

The U.S. must ensure that it remains a strong presence with African partner nations across all five regions of the Africa AOR. The best way to do this is to leverage the instruments of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, and economics—“DIME”). When looking specifically at the military instrument of national power, USAFRICOM must continue to engage in Phase Zero shaping operations. Security cooperation missions, especially MEDCAP and ENCAP missions, are the most noticeable Phase Zero shaping operations because they provide the most immediate and

noticeable results. Building partnership capacity will enable the U.S. to maintain regional stability and be able to better respond to future disaster response or pandemic outbreaks that may occur on the African continent. The continuing commitment of USAFRICOM to its partner African nations will serve as the foundation for enabling African nations to provide stability for themselves while still knowing that the U.S. will always be willing to support when asked. The following quote, by U.S. President Barack Obama, during an interview with *60 Minutes* on September 28, 2014, best summarizes the importance of a continuous and steadfast U.S. presence on the African continent for many decades to come:

The U.S. always takes the lead in international crisis. When trouble comes up anywhere in the world they don't call Beijing, they don't call Moscow. They call us. That's the deal, that's always the case. America leads. We are the indispensable nation. We have the capacity no one else has. Our military is the best in the history of the world. When there's a typhoon in the Philippines, take a look at who's helping the Philippines deal with that situation. When there's an earthquake in Haiti, take a look at who's leading the charge helping Haiti rebuild. That's how we roll. That's what makes us American.

— President Barack Obama

APPENDIX A
AFRICOM SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS 2014

AFRICOM OVERALL

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			306	\$75,502,429.62	\$3,819,644.39
Angola			3	\$300,001.00	
Benin			7	\$4,345,000.00	
Botswana			2	\$1,460,000.00	
Burkina Faso			1	\$2,153,000.00	
Burundi			12	\$2,077,153.00	\$447,120.00
Cameroon			9	\$1,985,000.00	\$100,000.00
Cape Verde			1	\$45,600.00	
Chad			15	\$7,828,382.00	\$81,889.36
Comoros			1	\$100,000.00	
Congo - Democratic Republic of			8	\$485,034.00	\$111,291.04
Congo - Republic of			8	\$482,392.00	
Cote d Ivoire			2	\$2,223,000.00	
Djibouti			18	\$2,014,916.62	
Ethiopia			3	\$370,000.00	
Gabon			4	\$475,000.00	\$109,231.50
Gambia			16	\$990,000.00	
Ghana			13	\$4,051,501.00	\$115,949.00
Guinea			2	\$815,000.00	
Guinea-Bissau			2	\$545,600.00	
Kenya			34	\$6,413,708.00	\$384,171.92
Lesotho			1		
Liberia			2	\$3,825,000.00	\$110,519.01
Libya			1	\$10,000.00	
Malawi			2	\$1,303,000.00	
Mali			6	\$855,600.00	\$2,324.69
Mauritania			3	\$830,000.00	\$14,383.00
Morocco			2	\$578,000.00	\$280,000.00
Mozambique			4	\$266,298.00	\$129,000.00
Namibia			7	\$1,151,459.00	\$83,000.00
Niger			6	\$1,521,688.00	\$158,493.94
Nigeria			5	\$3,583,000.00	\$857,806.20
Rwanda			6	\$2,163,000.00	
Sao Tome and Principe			4	\$680,000.00	
Senegal			33	\$5,919,917.00	\$742,721.60
Seychelles			3	\$625,000.00	
Sierra Leone			2	\$1,100,000.00	
South Africa			6	\$2,044,387.00	\$46,743.13
South Sudan			5	\$164,180.00	
Tanzania			25	\$4,409,114.00	\$45,000.00
Togo			12	\$2,879,999.00	
Tunisia			3	\$542,500.00	
Uganda			7	\$1,890,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX A, TAB 1
AFRICOM MEDCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			97	\$13,018,668.00	\$515,875.29
Benin			1	\$300,000.00	
Burundi			5	\$835,000.00	
Cameroon			2	\$475,000.00	
Cape Verde			1	\$45,600.00	
Chad			5	\$5,173,020.00	\$24,183.64
Comoros			1	\$100,000.00	
Congo - Democratic Republic of			4	\$60,000.00	\$711.04
Cote d Ivoire			1	\$80,000.00	
Djibouti			9	\$1,145,900.00	
Gabon			2	\$95,000.00	\$109,231.50
Gambia			6	\$430,000.00	
Ghana			6	\$268,501.00	\$115,949.00
Guinea			1	\$15,000.00	
Guinea-Bissau			1	\$45,600.00	
Kenya			11	\$570,000.00	\$49,259.88
Mali			4	\$55,600.00	\$2,324.69
Mauritania			1	\$15,000.00	
Niger			3	\$145,000.00	\$143,493.94
Nigeria			1	\$10,000.00	
Rwanda			2	\$200,000.00	
Sao Tome and Principe			1	\$15,000.00	
Senegal			13	\$277,447.00	\$70,721.60
Seychelles			1	\$100,000.00	
Sierra Leone			1	\$300,000.00	
Tanzania			9	\$1,592,001.00	
Togo			2	\$514,999.00	
Tunisia			2	\$5,000.00	
Uganda			1	\$150,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX A, TAB 2
AFRICOM ENCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			76	\$43,432,560.00	\$1,532,237.25
Benin			1	\$2,563,000.00	
Botswana			2	\$1,460,000.00	
Burkina Faso			1	\$2,153,000.00	
Burundi			1	\$650,000.00	
Cameroon			3	\$660,000.00	\$100,000.00
Chad			1	\$800,000.00	
Congo - Republic of			3	\$240,000.00	
Cote d Ivoire			1	\$2,143,000.00	
Djibouti			3	\$27,000.00	
Ethiopia			2	\$370,000.00	
Gabon			1	\$80,000.00	
Gambia			5	\$560,000.00	
Ghana			3	\$3,783,000.00	
Guinea			1	\$800,000.00	
Guinea-Bissau			1	\$500,000.00	
Kenya			14	\$4,470,560.00	\$168,912.04
Liberia			2	\$3,825,000.00	\$110,519.01
Malawi			1	\$963,000.00	
Mali			1	\$800,000.00	
Mauritania			1	\$800,000.00	
Morocco			2	\$578,000.00	\$280,000.00
Namibia			1	\$963,000.00	
Niger			2	\$815,000.00	\$15,000.00
Nigeria			4	\$3,573,000.00	\$857,806.20
Rwanda			1	\$963,000.00	
Sao Tome and Principe			1	\$15,000.00	
Senegal			5	\$2,860,000.00	
Sierra Leone			1	\$800,000.00	
South Africa			1	\$963,000.00	
Tanzania			2	\$1,000,000.00	
Togo			2	\$1,515,000.00	
Uganda			6	\$1,740,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX A, TAB 3
AFRICOM EDUCATION SUPPORT MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			46	\$9,370,403.62	\$61,126.13
Angola			2	\$300,000.00	
Benin			5	\$1,482,000.00	
Cameroon			1	\$10,000.00	
Djibouti			6	\$842,016.62	
Gabon			1	\$300,000.00	
Kenya			2	\$265,000.00	
Libya			1	\$10,000.00	
Malawi			1	\$340,000.00	
Mauritania			1	\$15,000.00	\$14,383.00
Mozambique			1	\$60,000.00	
Rwanda			2	\$1,000,000.00	
Sao Tome and Principe			2	\$650,000.00	
Senegal			3	\$45,000.00	
Seychelles			2	\$525,000.00	
South Africa			5	\$1,081,387.00	\$46,743.13
Tanzania			6	\$1,595,000.00	
Togo			5	\$850,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX A, TAB 4

AFRICOM MINE ACTION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			51	\$3,776,842.00	\$1,710,405.72
Angola			1	\$1.00	
Burundi			6	\$592,153.00	\$447,120.00
Chad			7	\$810,062.00	\$57,705.72
Congo - Democratic Republic of			4	\$425,034.00	\$110,580.00
Congo - Republic of			5	\$242,392.00	
Kenya			4	\$162,148.00	\$166,000.00
Mozambique			2	\$163,480.00	\$129,000.00
Namibia			5	\$188,459.00	\$83,000.00
Senegal			7	\$806,820.00	\$672,000.00
South Sudan			5	\$164,180.00	
Tanzania			5	\$222,113.00	\$45,000.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX A, TAB 5

AFRICOM MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
AFRICOM			36	\$5,903,956.00	
Cameroon			3	\$840,000.00	
Chad			2	\$1,045,300.00	
Ethiopia			1		
Humanitarian Assistance			1		
Gambia			5		
Ghana			4		
Kenya			3	\$946,000.00	
Lesotho			1		
Mali			1		
Mozambique			1	\$42,818.00	
Namibia			1		
Niger			1	\$561,688.00	
Rwanda			1		
Senegal			5	\$1,930,650.00	
Tanzania			3		
Togo			3	\$0.00	
Tunisia			1	\$537,500.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=AFRICOM>.

APPENDIX B
EUCOM SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS 2014

EUCOM OVERALL

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			231	\$32,457,444.00	\$3,218,605.74
Albania			6	\$1,145,001.00	
Armenia			11	\$1,015,001.00	\$30,000.00
Azerbaijan			9	\$2,136,001.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			12	\$2,200,002.00	\$306,414.00
Bulgaria			15	\$2,030,001.00	\$48,285.52
Croatia			16	\$1,820,939.00	\$108,135.38
Cyprus			1	\$100,000.00	
Estonia			3	\$250,001.00	
Georgia			14	\$1,950,105.00	\$490,000.00
Germany			1	\$10,000.00	
Greenland			1		
Israel			5	\$1,656,500.00	\$375,100.00
Kosovo			21	\$1,087,005.00	\$22,205.84
Latvia			9	\$1,831,602.00	\$1,394,665.98
Lithuania			6	\$1.00	
Macedonia			18	\$1,629,108.00	\$334,708.45
Moldova			21	\$2,892,501.00	\$84,564.92
Montenegro			5	\$725,001.00	
Romania			14	\$2,575,900.00	\$15,248.82
Serbia			29	\$4,591,772.00	\$9,276.83
Slovenia			1	\$100,000.00	
Ukraine			13	\$2,711,003.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX B, TAB 1
EUCOM MEDCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			48	\$6,985,008.00	\$531,414.19
Albania			1	\$1.00	
Armenia			3	\$430,000.00	\$15,000.00
Azerbaijan			1	\$500,000.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			1	\$10,000.00	
Bulgaria			2	\$535,000.00	
Croatia			1	\$15,000.00	\$13,788.90
Estonia			1	\$1.00	
Georgia			6	\$996,001.00	\$450,000.00
Kosovo			4	\$2,003.00	\$10,618.00
Lithuania			3		
Macedonia			3	\$1,250,000.00	
Moldova			4	\$555,000.00	\$26,758.47
Romania			8	\$1,487,000.00	\$15,248.82
Serbia			7	\$605,000.00	
Ukraine			3	\$600,002.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX B, TAB 2
EUCOM ENCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			80	\$9,292,628.00	\$213,310.58
Azerbaijan			5	\$1,451,000.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			3	\$2.00	
Bulgaria			7	\$325,001.00	\$47,993.95
Croatia			9	\$604,439.00	\$94,346.48
Georgia			4	\$769,102.00	
Kosovo			5	\$8,001.00	\$3,886.87
Latvia			2	\$422,001.00	
Lithuania			2	\$1.00	
Macedonia			9	\$44,108.00	
Moldova			13	\$1,982,500.00	\$57,806.45
Montenegro			1	\$1.00	
Romania			1	\$2,500.00	
Serbia			17	\$3,253,972.00	\$9,276.83
Ukraine			2	\$430,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX B, TAB 3
EUCOM EDUCATION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			56	\$8,482,307.00	\$998,780.97
Albania			2	\$795,000.00	
Armenia			4	\$235,001.00	\$15,000.00
Azerbaijan			3	\$185,001.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			5	\$1,920,000.00	\$306,414.00
Bulgaria			3	\$775,000.00	\$291.57
Croatia			1	\$701,500.00	
Georgia			3	\$35,002.00	\$40,000.00
Germany			1	\$10,000.00	
Greenland			1		
Kosovo			7	\$12,000.00	\$7,700.97
Latvia			4	\$255,001.00	\$294,665.98
Macedonia			4	\$335,000.00	\$334,708.45
Moldova			2	\$5,001.00	
Montenegro			1	\$305,000.00	
Romania			3	\$600,000.00	
Serbia			5	\$732,800.00	
Ukraine			7	\$1,581,001.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX B, TAB 4

EUCOM MINE ACTION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			26	\$3,190,000.00	
Albania			2	\$350,000.00	
Armenia			4	\$350,000.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			3	\$270,000.00	
Bulgaria			1	\$100,000.00	
Croatia			4	\$500,000.00	
Cyprus			1	\$100,000.00	
Estonia			2	\$250,000.00	
Georgia			1	\$150,000.00	
Kosovo			1	\$150,000.00	
Moldova			2	\$350,000.00	
Montenegro			3	\$420,000.00	
Slovenia			1	\$100,000.00	
Ukraine			1	\$100,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX B, TAB 5
EUCOM MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
EUCOM			21	\$4,507,501.00	\$1,475,100.00
Albania			1		
Bulgaria			2	\$295,000.00	
Croatia			1		
Israel			5	\$1,656,500.00	\$375,100.00
Kosovo			4	\$915,001.00	
Latvia			3	\$1,154,600.00	\$1,100,000.00
Lithuania			1		
Macedonia			2		
Romania			2	\$486,400.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=EUCOM>.

APPENDIX C

PACOM SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS 2014

PACOM OVERALL

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			631	\$103,086,892.31	\$16,284,174.06
Australia			4	\$30,150.00	
Bangladesh			46	\$8,199,892.00	\$453,359.00
Brunei			1	\$5,000.00	
Burma			6	\$621,468.00	
Cambodia			51	\$8,936,985.50	\$3,511,836.86
China			5	\$59,000.00	
Fiji			1	\$11,000.00	
Guam			2	\$323,536.00	\$66,359.24
Hawaii			48	\$5,580,100.00	\$1,876,012.87
India			23	\$2,150,500.00	\$55,810.91
Indonesia			44	\$9,742,795.00	\$1,042,665.34
Japan			5	\$188,915.00	\$18,000.00
Kiribati			2	\$120,000.00	
Laos			20	\$6,065,890.00	\$466,788.55
Malaysia			31	\$2,639,116.00	\$354,243.89
Maldives			5	\$191,942.00	\$89,000.00
Marshall Islands			3	\$430,140.00	
Micronesia			14	\$1,009,622.00	\$256,086.26
Mongolia			22	\$3,400,050.00	\$2,054,127.69
Nepal			27	\$7,194,653.00	\$988,426.53
New Zealand			1	\$3,500.00	
Palau			6	\$487,271.00	
Papua New Guinea			10	\$943,000.00	
Philippines			86	\$12,446,122.24	\$2,544,307.06
Samoa			1	\$20,000.00	
Singapore			5	\$230,000.00	
Solomon Islands			3	\$500,000.00	\$422,402.00
South Korea			3	\$210,450.00	\$102,200.00
Sri Lanka			17	\$4,302,511.00	\$502,412.31
Taiwan			1	\$84,416.00	
Thailand			50	\$7,118,796.00	\$554,879.66
Timor-Leste			20	\$2,900,201.00	\$32,101.00
Tonga			6	\$444,000.00	\$263,670.00
Vanuatu			3	\$267,000.00	\$263,000.00
Vietnam			59	\$16,228,870.57	\$366,484.89

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX C, TAB 1
PACOM MEDCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			95	\$14,720,021.50	\$3,249,313.68
Bangladesh			4	\$349,620.00	\$44,659.00
Burma			2	\$163,260.00	
Cambodia			22	\$5,294,185.50	\$2,730,910.86
China			1	\$20,000.00	
Hawaii			1	\$22,000.00	
India			1	\$50,000.00	\$2,600.00
Indonesia			4	\$593,460.00	
Japan			3	\$102,555.00	\$18,000.00
Laos			8	\$3,034,290.00	\$269,877.64
Malaysia			1	\$14,000.00	\$6,204.89
Maldives			1	\$48,970.00	
Marshall Islands			1	\$30,140.00	
Micronesia			5	\$153,601.00	\$64,441.29
Mongolia			6	\$118,002.00	\$25,415.00
Nepal			3	\$237,000.00	
Palau			2	\$14,771.00	
Papua New Guinea			3	\$175,000.00	
Philippines			6	\$535,301.00	\$71,205.00
Sri Lanka			1	\$164,290.00	
Thailand			5	\$230,090.00	\$16,000.00
Timor-Leste			2	\$516,000.00	
Vietnam			13	\$2,853,486.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX C, TAB 2
PACOM ENCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			246	\$46,420,909.24	\$5,763,489.48
Australia			4	\$30,150.00	
Bangladesh			31	\$6,916,568.00	\$408,700.00
Burma			4	\$458,208.00	
Cambodia			7	\$665,000.00	\$144,638.00
China			4	\$39,000.00	
Fiji			1	\$11,000.00	
Hawaii			11	\$1,880,718.00	\$1,106,279.00
India			11	\$714,500.00	\$33,210.91
Indonesia			18	\$5,584,428.00	
Kiribati			2	\$120,000.00	
Laos			6	\$771,600.00	\$196,910.91
Malaysia			7	\$196,530.00	\$12,614.00
Maldives			1	\$34,500.00	
Marshall Islands			2	\$400,000.00	
Micronesia			5	\$361,001.00	\$57,644.97
Mongolia			3	\$598,000.00	\$264,000.00
Nepal			22	\$6,810,181.00	\$846,926.53
New Zealand			1	\$3,500.00	
Palau			3	\$272,500.00	
Papua New Guinea			5	\$716,000.00	
Philippines			37	\$5,401,859.24	\$1,769,158.30
Samoa			1	\$20,000.00	
Singapore			2	\$230,000.00	
South Korea			2	\$85,450.00	\$59,105.00
Sri Lanka			10	\$2,818,500.00	\$102,412.31
Taiwan			1	\$84,416.00	
Thailand			13	\$1,237,000.00	\$369,019.66
Timor-Leste			4	\$602,000.00	\$32,101.00
Tonga			2	\$260,000.00	\$236,170.00
Vietnam			26	\$9,098,300.00	\$124,598.89

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX C, TAB 3

PACOM EDUCATION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			82	\$13,545,971.00	\$2,145,186.20
Cambodia			3	\$1,215,000.00	
Hawaii			8	\$993,722.00	\$176,033.44
India			1	\$120,000.00	\$20,000.00
Indonesia			4	\$223,444.00	\$131,500.00
Laos			4	\$2,260,000.00	
Malaysia			6	\$396,086.00	\$290,925.00
Maldives			1	\$89,472.00	\$89,000.00
Micronesia			4	\$495,020.00	\$134,000.00
Mongolia			7	\$894,048.00	\$702,672.00
Nepal			1	\$89,472.00	\$89,000.00
Papua New Guinea			1	\$30,000.00	
Philippines			14	\$754,974.00	\$106,495.76
Sri Lanka			3	\$817,912.00	
Thailand			7	\$359,620.00	\$134,060.00
Timor-Leste			9	\$1,689,201.00	
Tonga			2	\$47,000.00	\$8,500.00
Vanuatu			2	\$267,000.00	\$263,000.00
Vietnam			5	\$2,804,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX C, TAB 4

PACOM MINE ACTION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			15	\$4,282,000.00	\$1,622,402.00
Cambodia			6	\$1,407,000.00	\$600,000.00
Palau			1	\$200,000.00	
Philippines			1	\$235,000.00	
Solomon Islands			2	\$500,000.00	\$422,402.00
Sri Lanka			1	\$400,000.00	\$400,000.00
Thailand			1	\$400,000.00	
Vietnam			3	\$1,140,000.00	\$200,000.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX C, TAB 5
PACOM MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
PACOM			193	\$24,117,990.57	\$3,503,782.70
Bangladesh			11	\$933,704.00	
Brunei			1	\$5,000.00	
Cambodia			13	\$355,800.00	\$36,288.00
Guam			2	\$323,536.00	\$66,359.24
Hawaii			28	\$2,683,660.00	\$593,700.43
India			10	\$1,266,000.00	
Indonesia			18	\$3,341,463.00	\$911,165.34
Japan			2	\$86,360.00	
Laos			2		
Malaysia			17	\$2,032,500.00	\$44,500.00
Maldives			2	\$19,000.00	
Mongolia			6	\$1,790,000.00	\$1,062,040.69
Nepal			1	\$58,000.00	\$52,500.00
Papua New Guinea			1	\$22,000.00	
Philippines			28	\$5,518,988.00	\$597,448.00
Singapore			3	\$0.00	
Solomon Islands			1		
South Korea			1	\$125,000.00	\$43,095.00
Sri Lanka			2	\$101,809.00	
Thailand			24	\$4,892,086.00	\$35,800.00
Timor-Leste			5	\$93,000.00	
Tonga			2	\$137,000.00	\$19,000.00
Vanuatu			1		
Vietnam			12	\$333,084.57	\$41,886.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=PACOM>.

APPENDIX D
SOUTHCOM SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS 2014

SOUTHCOM OVERALL

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			550	\$66,677,898.65	\$14,100,038.32
Antigua and Barbuda			1	\$15,000.00	\$5,000.00
Argentina			1	\$265,000.00	
Barbados			1	\$10,400.00	
Belize			42	\$5,687,245.00	\$1,648,300.91
Bolivia			1		
Brazil			2		
Chile			4	\$18,000.00	\$12,301.89
Colombia			128	\$7,205,103.56	\$3,055,246.65
Conference - Multiple Countries			1	\$30,000.00	\$1,266.58
Costa Rica			2	\$585,000.10	\$40,508.08
Dominica			3	\$440,670.00	\$12,500.00
Dominican Republic			33	\$2,792,325.97	\$2,016,208.61
Ecuador			5	\$1,979,567.91	
El Salvador			15	\$802,240.00	\$126,308.21
Grenada			1	\$15,000.00	
Guatemala			58	\$5,666,836.10	\$1,138,126.30
Guyana			19	\$1,531,000.00	\$128,926.47
Haiti			8	\$599,200.00	\$691.28
Honduras			59	\$4,366,535.00	\$998,351.30
Jamaica			1	\$600,000.00	
Nicaragua			15	\$1,515,000.00	\$14,559.06
Panama			21	\$5,764,500.00	\$168,044.23
Paraguay			8	\$875,404.00	\$167,852.00
Peru			94	\$23,959,504.00	\$3,922,668.85
Saint Kitts and Nevis			1	\$477,000.00	
Saint Lucia			2	\$30,000.00	\$27,600.00
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines			4	\$45,001.00	\$48,025.66
Suriname			12	\$417,361.00	\$500,000.00
Trinidad and Tobago			1	\$750,000.00	
Uruguay			6	\$235,005.00	
USA - Veterans Affairs Project			1	\$0.01	\$67,552.24

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX D, TAB 1

SOUTHCOM MEDCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			260	\$16,605,050.67	\$4,658,581.78
Belize			11	\$1,315,200.00	\$1,038,164.91
Colombia			84	\$1,157,202.56	\$800,276.40
Costa Rica			2	\$585,000.10	\$40,508.08
Dominican Republic			11	\$956,089.00	\$825,012.00
El Salvador			10	\$735,000.00	\$97,696.99
Guatemala			27	\$2,093,354.00	\$405,962.25
Guyana			10	\$148,000.00	\$89,123.00
Honduras			31	\$1,392,800.00	\$751,807.11
Jamaica			1	\$600,000.00	
Nicaragua			13	\$1,511,000.00	\$11,859.06
Panama			17	\$4,547,500.00	\$161,044.23
Paraguay			5	\$260,504.00	\$152,852.00
Peru			29	\$995,936.00	\$198,697.85
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines			1	\$15,000.00	\$18,025.66
Suriname			5	\$263,260.00	
Uruguay			2	\$29,205.00	
USA - Veterans Affairs Project			1	\$0.01	\$67,552.24

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX D, TAB 2
SOUTHCOM ENCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			163	\$39,988,154.91	\$6,142,719.71
Antigua and Barbuda			1	\$15,000.00	\$5,000.00
Argentina			1	\$265,000.00	
Barbados			1	\$10,400.00	
Belize			3	\$1,755,000.00	
Brazil			1		
Chile			1	\$15,000.00	\$12,301.89
Colombia			9	\$4,871,000.00	\$835,388.00
Conference - Multiple Countries			1	\$30,000.00	\$1,266.58
Dominica			3	\$440,670.00	\$12,500.00
Dominican Republic			12	\$943,171.00	\$705,296.61
Ecuador			4	\$1,679,567.91	
El Salvador			5	\$67,240.00	\$28,611.22
Grenada			1	\$15,000.00	
Guatemala			15	\$2,305,350.00	\$67,544.47
Guyana			5	\$1,065,000.00	\$39,803.47
Haiti			6	\$334,200.00	\$691.28
Honduras			16	\$2,837,285.00	\$150,044.19
Nicaragua			1	\$4,000.00	\$2,700.00
Panama			1	\$75,000.00	
Paraguay			2	\$29,900.00	\$15,000.00
Peru			58	\$21,618,569.00	\$3,708,972.00
Saint Kitts and Nevis			1	\$477,000.00	
Saint Lucia			2	\$30,000.00	\$27,600.00
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines			3	\$30,001.00	\$30,000.00
Suriname			6	\$119,001.00	\$500,000.00
Trinidad and Tobago			1	\$750,000.00	
Uruguay			3	\$205,800.00	

Source U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX D, TAB 3
SOUTHCOM EDUCATION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			73	\$7,007,388.10	\$3,120,736.83
Belize			14	\$1,895,045.00	\$610,136.00
Chile			1	\$3,000.00	
Colombia			24	\$673,166.00	\$1,419,582.25
Dominican Republic			3	\$317,446.00	\$307,900.00
Guatemala			12	\$950,132.10	\$664,619.58
Haiti			1	\$265,000.00	
Honduras			8	\$96,500.00	\$96,500.00
Panama			3	\$1,142,000.00	\$7,000.00
Paraguay			1	\$585,000.00	
Peru			5	\$1,044,999.00	\$14,999.00
Suriname			1	\$35,100.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX D, TAB 4
SOUTHCOM MINE ACTION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			3	\$900,000.00	
Colombia			1	\$300,000.00	
Ecuador			1	\$300,000.00	
Peru			1	\$300,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX D, TAB 5
SOUTHCOM MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
SOUTHCOM			51	\$2,177,304.97	\$178,000.00
Belize			14	\$722,000.00	
Bolivia			1		
Brazil			1		
Chile			2	\$0.00	
Colombia			10	\$203,735.00	
Dominican Republic			7	\$575,619.97	\$178,000.00
Guatemala			4	\$318,000.00	
Guyana			4	\$318,000.00	
Haiti			1		
Honduras			4	\$39,950.00	
Nicaragua			1		
Peru			1		
Uruguay			1		

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=SOUTHCOM>.

APPENDIX E
CENTCOM SECURITY COOPERATION MISSIONS 2014

CENTCOM OVERALL

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			89	\$22,524,103.53	\$2,919,864.10
Afghanistan			1		
Bahrain			3	\$2,408,000.00	
Jordan			34	\$8,523,000.00	\$563,696.88
Kazakhstan			2	\$500,000.00	
Kyrgyzstan			16	\$2,930,485.53	\$1,287,889.22
Lebanon			16	\$5,780,000.00	\$579,656.60
Pakistan			1	\$228,942.00	
Tajikistan			14	\$1,908,676.00	\$245,421.40
Yemen			2	\$245,000.00	\$243,200.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

APPENDIX E, TAB 1
CENTCOM MEDCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			39	\$6,931,576.53	\$1,553,636.22
Jordan			18	\$2,550,000.00	\$262,774.00
Kyrgyzstan			9	\$1,474,892.53	\$985,422.22
Lebanon			2	\$1,465,000.00	\$62,240.00
Tajikistan			8	\$1,196,684.00	
Yemen			2	\$245,000.00	\$243,200.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

APPENDIX E, TAB 2
CENTCOM ENCAP MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			7	\$2,913,943.00	\$452,101.00
Jordan			1	\$1,000,000.00	
Lebanon			3	\$1,385,000.00	\$452,100.00
Pakistan			1	\$228,942.00	
Tajikistan			2	\$300,001.00	\$1.00

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

APPENDIX E, TAB 4
CENTCOM EDUCATION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			28	\$4,299,593.00	\$444,406.48
Jordan			10	\$898,000.00	\$76,622.88
Kyrgyzstan			7	\$1,455,593.00	\$302,467.00
Lebanon			10	\$1,830,000.00	\$65,316.60
Tajikistan			1	\$116,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

APPENDIX E, TAB 5

CENTCOM MINE ACTION MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			3	\$295,991.00	\$245,420.40
Tajikistan			3	\$295,991.00	\$245,420.40

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

APPENDIX E, TAB 6
CENTCOM MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS 2014

Country Name	DSCA Number	Name	Number of Projects	Estimated Costs	Actual Cost
CENTCOM			12	\$8,083,000.00	\$224,300.00
Afghanistan			1		
Bahrain			3	\$2,408,000.00	
Jordan			5	\$4,075,000.00	\$224,300.00
Kazakhstan			2	\$500,000.00	
Lebanon			1	\$1,100,000.00	

Source: U.S. Army GeoSpatial Center, Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS), Humanitarian Civil Action Program Database, accessed May 3, 2015, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/projectsflowchart.aspx?COCOM=CENTCOM>.

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